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Energy Watchdog v. CERC (2017) — Force Majeure & Frustration of Contract | The Law Easy

Energy Watchdog v. CERC (2017) — Force Majeure & Frustration of Contract

Supreme Court of India 2017 2017 SCC OnLine SC 378 Contract Law Force Majeure By Gulzar Hashmi India 26 Oct 2025

Primary: Energy Watchdog v. CERC; force majeure; frustration of contract; Section 56
Secondary: change in law; tariff risk; power purchase agreement; Indonesia coal

Hero image for Energy Watchdog v. CERC case explainer

Quick Summary

The Supreme Court held that price rise and reduced profits do not end a contract. Parties who bid a non-escalable tariff accept price risk. Force majeure protects only against events beyond control as listed in the clause; it is not a tool to escape a bad bargain.

  • Commercial hardship ≠ frustration.
  • Risk allocation in contract governs first.
  • Force majeure is clause-driven, not open-ended.
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Issues

  1. Can higher input costs and change in law abroad frustrate a PPA under Section 56?
  2. When does a force majeure clause excuse performance in tariff contracts?

Rules

  • Section 56 (Frustration): Applies only if a supervening event destroys the foundation of the contract, making performance radically different.
  • Force Majeure: An express clause listing events beyond control. It excuses performance only as per its text and risk allocation.
  • Commercial Impracticability: Mere price escalation or loss of profit is not frustration.

Facts — Timeline

Optional
Timeline visual for Energy Watchdog v. CERC

Tender for Power Supply

Gujarat Urja invites bids with option to quote escalable or non-escalable tariff.

Bid & PPA

Adani consortium wins with a non-escalable tariff and signs a Power Purchase Agreement.

Fuel Arrangements

Long-term Indonesian coal supply at fixed prices; bidders expect costs to be stable.

Change in Indonesian Law

Export pricing linked to international benchmarks. Coal cost rises; project profits shrink.

CERC Application

Appellants seek force majeure relief or economic restitution; CERC declines.

Litigation

Dispute escalates to courts. Core question: frustration vs assumed risk.

Arguments — Appellant vs Respondent

Appellants (Generators)

  • Change in Indonesian law made the bargain impossible/commercially unviable.
  • Seek discharge or a mechanism to restore prior economics.
  • Invoke force majeure / change-in-law relief.

Respondents (Discoms/State)

  • Risk of input price was assumed with non-escalable tariff.
  • No clause covers foreign law price changes as force majeure.
  • Performance still possible; only profits reduced.

Judgment

No Frustration
Judgment illustration for Energy Watchdog v. CERC

The Court refused to treat price rise as frustration. Performance was still possible. Bidders had chosen a non-escalable tariff, so they carried price risk. Force majeure is confined to events stated in the clause; economic loss alone is not force majeure.

Key line: A court will first read the contract’s risk allocation. Hardship or reduced profits do not dissolve the bargain.

Ratio Decidendi

  • Frustration arises only if the supervening event destroys the foundation of the contract.
  • Force majeure is clause-specific; price risk stays where the contract puts it.
  • Change in foreign law causing cost increase is not per se frustration.

Why It Matters

The case anchors Indian law on risk allocation in infrastructure contracts. It warns bidders: fixed tariffs mean you absorb input price shocks unless the contract clearly shifts that risk.

Key Takeaways

  • Hardship ≠ impossibility.
  • Read the clause first: it rules.
  • Fixed price = bidder bears price risk.
  • Use change-in-law and pass-through terms.
  • Define force majeure tightly; exclude price swings.
  • Record assumptions behind tariffs.

Mnemonic + 3-Step Hook

Mnemonic: “R-C-FRiskClauseFoundation

  1. Risk: Who bears price risk? Check tariff type.
  2. Clause: Force majeure/change-in-law governs relief.
  3. Foundation: Only if the bargain’s core collapses → frustration.

IRAC Outline

Issue

Do cost spikes from foreign law changes frustrate a fixed-tariff PPA? Does force majeure excuse performance?

Rule

Section 56 requires destruction of the contract’s foundation. Force majeure relief is limited to the clause terms.

Application

Performance remained possible; only profitability changed. Non-escalable tariff showed assumed risk.

Conclusion

No frustration; no force majeure relief for price rise absent express coverage.

Glossary (Easy English)

Force Majeure
A contract list of events beyond control (e.g., war, bans) that excuse or delay performance.
Frustration
Law ends a contract when a later event destroys its basic purpose.
Change in Law
New legal rule affecting costs/operations; relief depends on contract wording.
Non-escalable Tariff
Fixed price bid; bidder bears later cost increases unless the contract shifts risk.

Student FAQs

No. It is a commercial risk unless your contract shifts it via change-in-law or similar clauses.

Only when an event listed in the clause happens and prevents performance despite reasonable efforts.

Not automatically. It depends on your contract wording and how risks are allocated.

Include change-in-law pass-throughs, define force majeure carefully, and match tariff type to risk appetite.
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