Keshava Madhav Menon v. State of Bombay
Plain-language, classroom-style explainer on how the Court treated pre-Constitution press laws against new fundamental rights.
Quick Summary
The Supreme Court said that fundamental rights under the Constitution work forward, not backward. Old laws made before 26 January 1950 are not automatically erased. They continue unless they clash with the Constitution after that date.
So, a prosecution started under the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931 could continue even after the Constitution came into force. Article 13 makes an inconsistent law void to the extent of the inconsistency, but not with retro effect.
Issues
- Are Sections 15(1) and 18(1), read with “news sheet” and “press” definitions in Sections 2(6) and 2(10) of the 1931 Act, inconsistent with Article 19(1)(a) read with Article 19(2)?
- If they are inconsistent, can a prosecution that began before 26 January 1950 still go on?
Rules
- Article 13: Courts can declare a law void to the extent it violates fundamental rights. The effect is prospective from the Constitution’s start date.
- Article 19(1)(a) & 19(2): Free speech is protected, but the State may impose reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2).
Facts (Timeline)
Arguments
Appellant
- Definitions and controls under the 1931 Act curb free speech.
- After 26 Jan 1950, these parts are void under Articles 19 and 13.
- Pending prosecution should stop if the law is unconstitutional.
Respondent (State)
- Fundamental rights are not retrospective.
- Pre-Constitution liabilities survive; cases already started can continue.
- Article 13 does not erase past offences.
Judgment
The Court held that fundamental rights are prospective. Article 13 makes an inconsistent law inoperative to the extent of inconsistency from the Constitution’s start, but does not nullify past actions or liabilities. Hence, the prosecution against the appellant could validly proceed.
Ratio Decidendi
- Article 13 is not a time machine; its effect is forward-looking.
- Pre-Constitution laws stand unless they clash with fundamental rights after 26 Jan 1950.
- Pending prosecutions based on pre-Constitution offences are not wiped out.
Why It Matters
This case sets the tone for how Indian courts treat old laws when the Constitution introduces new rights. It balances free speech with continuity of the legal system.
Key Takeaways
- Prospective operation of Part III rights.
- Article 13 voids only to the extent of post-Constitution inconsistency.
- Pre-existing prosecutions remain valid.
- Free speech is strong but not retroactive.
Mnemonic + 3-Step Hook
Mnemonic: “PAST STAYS, FUTURE WEIGHS”
- PAST STAYS: Old law not erased on 26 Jan 1950.
- FUTURE WEIGHS: Only post-Constitution inconsistency matters.
- CASES CONTINUE: Pending prosecutions go on.
IRAC Outline
Issue: Whether the 1931 Act provisions violate Article 19(1)(a) and, if yes, whether a pre-Constitution prosecution can continue.
Rule: Articles 13, 19(1)(a), 19(2).
Application: Fundamental rights are not retrospective; inconsistency operates only after 26 Jan 1950; liabilities already in motion are unaffected.
Conclusion: Prosecution valid; provisions are not retrospectively void.
Glossary
- Prospective Effect
- A rule applies from now on, not to past events.
- Void to the Extent
- Only the clashing part of a law stops operating after the Constitution.
- News Sheet
- Term used in the 1931 Act for certain printed matter.
FAQs
Related Cases
A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (1950)
Early reading of fundamental rights framework after the Constitution commenced.
Fundamental RightsState of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara (1951)
Examines reasonableness of restrictions and operation of laws post-Constitution.
Reasonable Restrictions
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